In 2006, Hezbollah executed a bold guerrilla raid into Israel, triggering a 34-day war that inflicted severe damage on Lebanon and left a lasting impact on Israel. This conflict ended with a U.N. resolution designed to disarm the terrorist militia and establish a buffer zone to prevent its forces from approaching the border.

The resolution accomplished neither.

Instead, a blend of international optimism and the determination of Hezbollah’s backers in Tehran has led us to this critical juncture—on the brink of a conflict that could far exceed the scale of the fighting in Gaza. Is it possible to avert a full-blown war? It’s uncertain. However, the critical question is whether the lessons from 2006 can pave the way for a more favourable outcome this time around.

First lesson: Tactical brilliance cannot replace a solid strategy. In 2006, the Israeli Air Force, leveraging exceptional intelligence, successfully targeted numerous long-range rockets belonging to Hezbollah—often concealed within residential areas—by the second night of the conflict. This decisive strike undoubtedly saved countless Israeli lives.

Israel struggled to develop a coherent strategy for the war beyond an intense bombing campaign, which ultimately led to significant diplomatic pressure for a ceasefire. Additionally, their delayed ground incursion was met with solid resistance from Hezbollah. The pressing question now is whether Israel has a more effective plan in place today.

The second lesson is clear: Hezbollah is not Israel’s primary adversary; Iran is. As former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett aptly stated, Tehran is the head of the octopus, while Hezbollah — along with Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen — represents just one of its tentacles. Engaging in a conflict with Hezbollah could lead Israel to deplete its resources in a battle that is ultimately secondary.

Israel cannot afford to overlook Hezbollah; its stockpile of 120,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets presents a significant and immediate threat to the Israeli homeland. To effectively restore its deterrence, Israel must impose direct costs on Hezbollah’s backers. The actual centre of gravity in this conflict lies in Tehran, not Beirut.

Third lesson: Avoid antagonizing the Lebanese people.

Polling data from the Arab Barometer clearly indicates that Hezbollah is mainly unpopular among the majority of Lebanese, apart from its Shiite strongholds. This unpopularity is well-founded. The group has effectively taken control of the nation, eliminated its most revered leaders, transformed large parts of the country into a battleground, and prioritized the development of an extensive military infrastructure, all while the national economy is in freefall.

Israel had no realistic chance of transforming Lebanon into an ally; that possibility ended with the Syrian-backed assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the Israel-aligned president-elect, in 1982. However, it must avoid repeating the errors of 2006, which sought deterrence through sheer brute force. Instead, the precise and targeted strikes showcased in last week’s operations are far more effective in dismantling Hezbollah’s perceived invincibility.

Fourth lesson: Exclude the U.N. from the equation. While the Security Council’s Resolution 1701 was intended to authorize a U.N. peacekeeping force to stop Hezbollah from positioning its forces near the Israeli border following the 2006 war, the reality is that the U.N. peacekeepers failed to fulfil this mission, resulting in a significant financial burden on U.S. taxpayers amounting to billions.

Ellen DeGeneres is firmly stepping into her leadership role with her new Netflix special. If the United States and European nations are serious about establishing a buffer zone between Israel and Hezbollah, they must take decisive action by deploying their own troops under a NATO banner or inviting Arab states to contribute forces. Failing that, the most pragmatic solution may be to reinstate the Israeli-controlled security zone in southern Lebanon that existed from 1985 to 2000, despite the long-term challenges it may pose.

Fifth lesson: The United States’ role in the crisis should focus on ensuring Israel’s victory rather than pursuing a diplomatic solution.

Prior to Al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks, Hezbollah was responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist organization. Israel’s recent strike in Beirut, which eliminated Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqeel, served as retribution for the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks that resulted in the deaths of 258 Americans. Furthermore, Hezbollah has played a pivotal role in the atrocities committed against countless Syrians by supporting Bashar al-Assad in his brutal crackdown on his own citizens.

These crimes must never be forgotten or forgiven. It is unequivocally against the interests of the West to allow a terrorist group with growing connections to the Kremlin to maintain control over a Mediterranean state while it threatens its neighbours. Beyond Israel’s imperative for secure borders against Tehran’s Axis of Resistance, the United States has a vital interest in countering the expansion of what I define as the Axis of Repression. This coalition encompasses Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea.

This leads us to a crucial sixth lesson: It’s a mistake to see Israel’s battles merely as regional issues, disconnected from America’s core interests. In reality, we are in the early phases of a significant struggle between the free and unfree worlds. This conflict spans from Norway’s border with Russia to the Iranian people’s fight against their government and extends to the South China Sea. It is poised to endure for decades.

In this conflict, Israel stands with us while Hezbollah stands against us. No matter what unfolds in the coming days and weeks, we cannot afford to be neutral in this matter.